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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economies with production externalities, demand spillovers, incomplete ﬁnancial markets, and Keynesian
frictions are only a few examples where macroeconomic complementarities play a prominent role. Within
this class of economies, how does the precision of publicly provided and privately collected information aﬀect
equilibrium allocations and social welfare? And what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed,
for example, by economic statistics, policy announcements, or news in the media? To answer these questions,
we consider a simple real economy where the individual return to investment is increasing in the aggregate level
of investment and where market participants have heterogenous expectations about the underlying economic
fundamentals (the exogenous productivity). We interpret an increase in the transparency of public information
either as a reduction in the level of common uncertainty for given level of idiosyncratic uncertainty (that is, an
increase in the absolute precision of public information), or as a reduction in the heterogeneity of expectations
across market participants for given level of overall uncertainty (that is, an increase in the relative precision
of public information).
We ﬁrst consider an environment where complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no
matter the structure of information. Like in Morris and Shin (2002), complementarities increase the sensi-
tivity of equilibrium allocations with respect to public information, which increases the volatility generated
by common noise in market expectations. Moreover, when information is heterogeneous, an increase in the
precision of public information may have the perverse eﬀect of increasing aggregate volatility, by increasing
the sensitivity of economic activity to common noise. On the contrary, an increase in the precision of private
information necessarily reduces aggregate volatility. Nevertheless, we show that, as long as there is no value
to lotteries, welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision
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of public information. Hence, policies that either disseminate more precise information about economic fun-
damentals, or reduce the heterogeneous interpretation of economic statistics and policy measures, necessarily
boost welfare. On the contrary, an increase in the precision of private information may reduce welfare by
increasing the heterogeneity of expectations and thereby obstructing coordination in the market, in which
case policies that discourage the private collection of private information may increase welfare.
Morris and Shin (2002) have recently argued that, in environments with strategic complementarities and
heterogeneous information, more precise public information can reduce social welfare, whereas more precise
private information is always beneﬁcial. We ﬁn dr a t h e rt h eo p p o s i t e .T h ed i ﬀerence in the results is due to
an important distinction between the environments in the two models. Morris and Shin (2002) consider a
kind of “beauty contest,” where the payoﬀ of a player decreases with the distance between his own action
and the action of others, but where this distance is irrelevant from a social perspective. It follows that the
complementarity is present only at the private level and hence the attempt of the agents to align their actions
is socially wasteful. In this case, more transparent public information facilitates more eﬀective coordination,
which is valued by the market but not by the society. In contrast, we consider environments where the
complementarity is present at the social level so that eﬀective market coordination is socially valuable, as it is
likely to be the case in economies with production and demand spillovers, network externalities, or incomplete
ﬁnancial markets. As shown in Angeletos and Pavan (2003), market participants use public information to align
their investment choices, but not enough as compared to what is socially optimal, for they do not internalize
the positive externality of their investment on the return to others. As a consequence, more transparent public
information, by permitting more eﬀective coordination in the market, necessarily increases welfare, despite
t h ef a c tt h a ti tm a yl e a dt oh i g h e rv o l a t i l i t y . 1
In the light of these results, we ﬁnally consider the possibility that complementarities are strong enough
that multiple equilibria emerge for certain structures of information, in which case more eﬀective coordination
in the market need not always be socially beneﬁcial. Indeed, there is a critical threshold for the transparency
of public information above which multiple equilibrium levels of investment are possible. Above this threshold,
the desirability of more eﬀective market coordination and thus the welfare eﬀect of more transparent public
information depend critically on which equilibrium is selected. If the market coordinates on the socially
desirable equilibrium, facilitating coordination is beneﬁcial, and welfare tends to be maximized at high levels
of transparency. If instead the market coordinates on the undesirable equilibrium, impeding coordination by
introducing noise in public information can be welfare enhancing.
This ﬁnal result is related to Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2003). They show that, in coordination
environments where a privately-informed policy maker is interested in fashioning market outcomes, active
policy intervention may lead to policy traps, where the optimal policy and market outcomes are dictated
largely by arbitrary self-fulﬁlling market expectations. In the present paper, we do not consider active policyG.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 3
intervention. Nevertheless, a similar trap emerges regarding the information disseminated by government
agencies and central bankers: The optimal transparency depends on the aggressiveness or leniency of market
expectations.
We conclude that, in the class of environments considered in this paper,2 noise in public information may
be socially desirable only when there is a high risk that more transparency will introduce coordination failures.
Otherwise, the timely and frequent provision of public information seems warranted from a social perspective,
even if that may lead to an increase in volatility.
2 Weak Complementarities
Preferences and Technologies. The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of agents, indexed
by i and uniformly distributed over the [0,1] interval. Agents are risk neutral with utility
ui = Aki − 1
2k2
i. (1)
We interpret ki ∈ R as individual investment (or eﬀort), A as the return to investment, and k2
i/2 as the cost
of investment. We let K =
R 1
0 kidi denote the aggregate level of investment.
Like in Bryant (1983), Cooper and John (1988), Acemoglu (1993), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), and
others, we introduce a complementarity by assuming that the individual return to investment is increasing in
the aggregate level of investment:
A =( 1− α)θ + αK. (2)
The random variable θ parametrizes the exogenous return to investment (the underlying fundamentals of the
economy) and the coeﬃcient α ≥ 0 captures the degree of complementarity.
Finally, social welfare is given by a utilitarian aggregator, w =
R 1
0 uidi. Using (1) and (2), we have that










0 (ki − K)2di measures the cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment. Note that w is concave
in K for α<1/2, w h e r e a si ti sc o n v e xf o rα>1/2. In the latter case, lotteries would be welfare increasing and
volatility in K would be desirable. Since we are interested in the canonical case where welfare is decreasing in
both volatility and heterogeneity, we restrict α ∈ [0,1/2). This also suﬃces for the equilibrium to be unique.3
Information and Transparency. The fundamentals θ ∈ R are not known at the time investment decisions
are made. Furthermore, agents have heterogenous beliefs about θ. For simplicity, we let the common prior
about θ be uniform over R. We summarize the public information by a suﬃcient statistic z such that z =
θ + σzε, where ε is standard normal, independent of θ and common across agents. Similarly, the privateG.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 4
information of agent i is summarized by a suﬃcient statistic xi = θ + σxξi, where ξi is standard normal,
independent of θ and i.i.d. across agents. σz and σx parametrize the precision of public and private information,
respectively.
Letting δ ≡ σ−2
z /(σ−2
x + σ−2
z ) and σ ≡ (σ−2
x + σ−2
z )−1/2, the posterior belief of agent i about θ is normal
with mean Ei [θ] ≡ E[θ|xi,z]=( 1− δ)xi + δz and variance Va r i[θ] ≡ Va r[θ|xi,z]=σ2. Literally interpreted,
the dependence of Ei [θ] on xi is the result of the observation of private signals about θ. More generally,
however, xi introduces idiosyncratic variation in market expectations about the fundamentals and may thus
be read also as heterogeneity in the ﬁltering and interpretation of commonly available information. In this
sense, δ measures the level of conformity in market expectations, whereas σ the quality of available information.
In the following, we interpret an increase in the transparency of public information either as a reduction
in σz for given σx (that is, an increase in the absolute precision of public information), or an increase in δ
for given σ ( a ni n c r e a s ei nt h erelative precision of public information4). What we have in mind is that the
transparency of public announcements, policy measures, and news in the media may aﬀect either the noise in
publicly available information, or the extent to which such information is interpreted diﬀerently across market
participants. As it will become clear, our results are not very sensitive to which of the two interpretations we
adopt.
2.1 Equilibrium
Each agent chooses ki so as to maximize Ei [ui]. It follows that the optimal investment is given by
ki = Ei[A]=( 1 − α)Ei[θ]+αEi[K]. (3)
Individual investment is thus increasing in the expected level of the fundamentals and in the expected level of
aggregate investment.
Given the linearity of (3) and the normality of posterior beliefs about θ, equilibrium investment decisions
are linear so that ki = βxi +γz, where β and γ are constants determined in equilibrium. Then, K = βθ+γz
and thus
ki = Ei[A]=( 1 − α + αβ)[(1− δ)xi + δz]+αγz.
It follows that β =( 1−α)(1−δ)/[1−α(1−δ)] and γ = δ/[1−α(1−δ)]. Clearly, this is the unique symmetric
linear (rational expectations) equilibrium. Furthermore, as proved in Morris and Shin (2002), when best
responses are linear in Ei[θ] and Ei[K], there do not exist equilibria other than this one.5 Hence,
Proposition 1 The equilibrium exists, is unique, and is given by ki = βxi + γz, where
β =1− δ − ρ, γ = δ + ρ, and ρ =
αδ(1 − δ)
1 − α(1 − δ)
. (4)G.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 5
Note that β =1− δ and γ = δ for α =0 . The term ρ thus measures the excess sensitivity of equilibrium
allocations to public information as compared to the case where there are no complementarities. Moreover,
ρ is increasing in α. Stronger complementarities thus lead to a higher sensitivity of investment to public
information. This is a direct implication of the fact that, in equilibrium, the public signal is a relatively better
predictor of aggregate behavior than the private signal.
The equilibrium levels of volatility and heterogeneity are Va r(K|θ)=( γσz)2 and Va r(ki|θ,z)=( βσx)2,
respectively, where β and γ are given by (4). It follows that
Proposition 2 (i) Volatility necessarily increases with an increase in δ for given σ, and increases with a
reduction in σz for given σx if and only if σ2
z > 1
1−ασ2
x. (ii) Heterogeneity falls with either an increase in δ or
ar e d u c t i o ni nσz.
This result may suggest that transparency can be socially undesirable when it increases volatility. How-
ever, we will see that welfare necessarily increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute
precision of public information.
2.2 Welfare




Ω =( βσx)2 +( 1− 2α)(γσz)2 = Va r(ki|θ,z)+( 1− 2α)Va r(K|θ).
Ω measures the welfare consequences of heterogeneity in individual investment and volatility in aggregate
investment. Since α<1/2, welfare decreases with both heterogeneity and volatility. Furthermore, the relative
weight on heterogeneity is increasing in α. This reﬂects the social value of coordination: The stronger the
complementarity, the more important the alignment in individual investment decisions.
Using (4) and substituting σx = σ/
√




(1 − 2α)+α2(1 − δ)
[1 − α(1 − δ)]
2 σ2.
It follows that α ∈ [0,1/2) suﬃces for Ω > 0 and therefore
Proposition 3 Welfare necessarily increases with either an increase in δ or a reduction in σ.
That welfare decreases with σ for given δ follows directly from the fact that an increase in σ means an
increase in both volatility and heterogeneity. On the other hand, as shown in Proposition 2, an increase
in δ implies lower heterogeneity at the expense of higher volatility. To understand why the eﬀect of lower
heterogeneity dominates, note that social welfare under a utilitarian objective coincides with the expectedG.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 6
utility of an agent. Suppose for a moment that there were no complementarity (α =0 ) , in which case
β =1− δ and γ = δ. It follows that Ω =( βσx)2 +( γσz)2 =( 1− δ)σ2 + δσ2 = σ2, so that the expected
utility of an agent depends only on σ and not on δ. This result should be expected: An increase in δ given
σ substitutes a higher precision in public information for a lower precision in private information, without
altering the overall precision of information. When α =0 , individual choices are not interdependent and the
decomposition of information between private and public is irrelevant. When instead α>0, public information
becomes more important than private information in predicting the return to investment, so that a substitution
from private to public information raises the expected utility of an agent. In other words, an increase in δ
raises welfare because it permits the agents to second guess each others’ actions better and therefore facilitates
more coordination in the market.
We next consider the comparative statics of w with respect to σx and σz, which combine the eﬀects of δ















Proposition 4 (i) Ar e d u c t i o ni nσz necessarily increases welfare. (ii) Ar e d u c t i o ni nσx decreases welfare







Hence, more precise public information necessarily increases welfare. This is because a reduction in σz for
given σx implies both better coordination (higher δ) and lower uncertainty (lower σ). On the contrary, more
precise private information has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare. This is because a reduction in σx for given σz
means lower uncertainty (lower σ) at the expense of lower coordination (lower δ). If the complementarity is
suﬃciently weak, so that there is little value to coordination, or if the relative precision of public information
is very low, so that volatility is high, the beneﬁt of lower uncertainty outweighs the cost of lower coordination.
Otherwise, a reduction in σx reduces welfare.
One can interpret σx as the amount of information collected privately by market participants. Given
the precision of the information and the strategies of the other agents, an individual decision maker always
values more precise information. Hence, a lower σx is always beneﬁcial from a private perspective. On the
other hand, an agent may prefer other agents to have less precise private information, since this would permit
him to predict more accurately the aggregate level of investment. In other words, the private collection of
information may create a negative externality, implying that a lower σx need not be beneﬁcial from a social
viewpoint. We can thus have a market failure in the amount of private information collected by individual
agents, in which case government intervention that discourages the collection of private information may
actually increase welfare.G.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 7
Finally, our result that more transparency in public information increases welfare even though it may also
increase volatility, contrasts with the result of Morris and Shin (2002). As we anticipated in the introduction,
the diﬀerence is due to the social value of coordination. In our model, the complementarity is equally present
at the private and the social level.6 In Morris and Shin (2002), instead, there is an additional externality that
perfectly oﬀsets the complementarity at the social level. To see this, let L =( θ−A)K and suppose individual
payoﬀsi sui = Aki − 1
2k2






i)di. This is the
analogue of Morris and Shin (2002) in our setting. L is the externality that renders the social (gross) return
to investment independent of K, thus removing the complementarity at the social level. It follows that the
coordination motive is not warranted from a social perspective, in which case stronger complementarity or
more transparent public information may decrease welfare by exacerbating this motive. If instead coordination
is socially valuable, as it is probably the case in economies with production or demand spillovers, network
externalities, or incomplete ﬁnancial markets, then more transparency is most likely to boost welfare.
3 Strong Complementarities
In this section, we consider environments in which the complementarity is suﬃciently strong to induce multiple
equilibria for some information structures. To capture this possibility, we now let
A = θ + 1[K ≥ r],
where 1[K ≥ r] equals one if K ≥ r and zero otherwise. r ∈ (0,1) represents the critical size of aggregate
investment necessary for the complementarity to pay oﬀ; without serious loss of generality, we let r =1 /2.
For tractability, we also let the cost of investment be linear, so that
ui = Aki − ki,
and constrain ki ∈ [0,1].
Let θ ≡ 0 and θ ≡ 1. If θ ∈ [θ,θ] were common knowledge, both ki =1and ki =0for all i would be
an equilibrium; the former coincides with the ﬁrst best, whereas the latter represents a coordination failure.
With heterogeneous information, the possibility of multiple equilibria depends on the transparency of public
information, as we show next.
3.1 Equilibrium
An agent ﬁnds it optimal to invest ki =1if Ei [A] ≥ 1, and ki =0otherwise. We restrict attention to
equilibria with monotonic strategies, in which case for every z there exists x∗(z) such that ki =1if xi >x ∗(z)
and ki =0otherwise. Aggregate investment is then given by K(θ,z)=Φ([θ − x∗(z)]/σx) and is thusG.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 8
increasing in θ. This implies that K ≥ r (= 1/2) if and only if θ ≥ θ
∗(z), where θ
∗(z)=x∗(z), and therefore
E[A|xi,z]=E[θ|xi,z]+P r ( θ ≥ θ
∗|xi,z), or equivalently
E[A|xi,z]=( 1 − δ)xi + δz + Φ
µ





It follows that ki =1if x ≥ x∗, and ki =0otherwise, where x∗ solves E[A|x∗,z]=1 . Combining this with
θ
∗ = x∗, we conclude that the equilibrium threshold x∗ must solve
F(x∗;z,δ,σ) ≡ δ(z − x∗) − σΦ−1 [1 − (1 − δ)x∗ − δz]=0 . (5)




2πσ) and let b σz be the










z . If δ<b δ, or equivalently σz > b σz, then F is monotonic
in x for all z, and thus the equilibrium threshold x∗ is unique. F is instead non-monotonic whenever δ>b δ,
or equivalently σz < b σz. In this case, let z,z =1 /2 ±
©
m − Φ−1(m)σ(1 − δ)/δ − 1/2
ª
, where m>1/2 solves
φ(Φ−1(m)) = σ(1−δ)/δ, and note that 0 <z< 1/2 < z<1. For z/ ∈ (z,z), (5) has a unique solution x∗.B u t
for z ∈ (z,z), (5) admits three solutions, x∗
low <x ∗
medium <x ∗
high. The two extreme solutions represent stable
equilibria; the intermediate represents an unstable equilibrium, which we disregard. We conclude:
Proposition 5 (i) If δ<b δ (equivalently, σz > b σz), or z/ ∈ (z,z), there exists a unique threshold equilibrium:
ki =1if and only if xi ≥ x∗(z), where x∗(z) i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt oF(x∗;z,δ,σ)=0 . (ii) If instead δ>b δ
(equivalently, σz < b σz) and z ∈ (z,z), there exist exactly two stable threshold equilibria: In the ﬁrst, ki =1if
and only if xi ≥ x∗




lowest and highest solutions to F(x∗;z,δ,σ)=0 .
A high level of transparency (high δ or low σz) may thus lead to multiple equilibria. When this is the
case, the second equilibrium (x∗
high) is characterized by less aggregate investment than the ﬁrst (x∗
low).
3.2 Welfare











increases with z, decreases with z, and decreases with σz for θ ∈ (z,z). Moreover, dz/dδ < 0 <d z/dδ. Hence,
Proposition 6 If δ>b δ (equivalently, σz < b σz) and θ ∈ (z,z), the probability of multiple equilibrium levels of
investment increases with either a higher δ for given σ, or a lower σz for given σx.
An increase in the level of transparency may thus decrease welfare by increasing the probability that
the “bad” equilibrium is played. Unfortunately, it is impossible to characterize welfare analytically. We thus
resort to numerical simulations.G.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 9
The eﬀect of σz on w(θ) is illustrated in Figure 1 for various values for θ. The solid lines represent welfare
along the high-investment equilibrium, whereas the dashed lines represent welfare along the low-investment
equilibrium. In general, the welfare eﬀects of transparency are neither monotonic nor homogeneous across θ.
However, the eﬀects tend to be small for suﬃciently low or suﬃciently high values of θ. We thus choose to
concentrate on intermediate fundamentals.
Since σz =0restores common knowledge for any given σx > 0, and since the “good” equilibrium under
common knowledge coincides with the ﬁrst best, it is trivial that welfare is maximized at σz =0 . Therefore,
provided that there is little risk of a coordination failure, full transparency is desirable. If instead the “bad”
equilibrium is played whenever multiple equilibria are possible, welfare tends to decrease with a reduction in
σz beyond b σz, in which case welfare is maximized at an intermediate level of transparency.
The patterns revealed by the examples of Figure 1 appear to be robust across a large number of simulations.
Also, simulations of the welfare eﬀect of δ give similar results and are omitted due to space limitations. We
thus conclude
Proposition 7 If the socially preferable equilibrium is selected with high probability whenever multiple equi-
libria are possible, welfare is robustly maximal at δ =1for given σ, and necessarily maximal at σz =0for
given σx. If instead the worse equilibrium is selected with high probability, welfare is robustly maximized at
δ ≤ b δ, or σz ≥ b σz.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper examined the welfare eﬀects of public and private information in an economy with investment
complementarities. If the complementarity is weak so that multiple equilibria are never possible, more trans-
parency in public information increases welfare, despite the fact that it also increases volatility. This is because
more transparency facilitates more eﬀective coordination in the market, which is socially valuable given that
the complementarity is present at the aggregate level. On the other hand, if the complementarity is strong so
that multiple equilibria are possible for high levels of transparency, more precise public information facilitates
more eﬀective market coordination on either equilibrium. In that case, “constructive ambiguity” becomes
optimal when there is a high risk that the undesirable equilibrium is selected.
In Angeletos and Pavan (2003), we examine in more detail the properties of equilibrium and optimal
allocations for economies with investment complementarities. We expect our insights to turn useful also in
the analysis of other settings in which aggregate complementarities play an important role, such as economies
with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, Keynesian frictions, or network externalities.G.M. Angeletos and A. Pavan 10
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1. In independent parallel work, Hellwig (2003) and Lorenzoni (2003), building on Woodford (2002),
examine monetary economies in which complementarities arise in pricing decisions. They also ﬁnd that the
Morris-Shin result about the social value of public information can be reversed. However, they do not show
how the welfare eﬀects of public information depend on whether market coordination is socially desirable.
2. Canzoneri (1985), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Atkeson and Kehoe (2001), Stokey (2002) and
others consider how the transparency of policy instruments relates to the ability of the market to detect policy
deviations in Barro-Gordon environments where the government lacks commitment. Our approach is clearly
orthogonal to that line of research.
3. The equilibrium is unique if and only if α<1. The case α ∈ [1/2,1) is considered in Angeletos and
Pavan (2003). In that case, introducing noise in public information can be desirable to the extent that this
substitutes for the absence of socially valuable lotteries.
4. Note that δ is an increasing transformation of the relative precision of public information.
5. Note that, although the two models are diﬀerent, the structure of the best responses is identical and
so are the equilibrium strategies.






































θ = - 0.5